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Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Kent School Corporation Inc.,
__Fed. Appx.__, 2014 WL 7011937 (2d Cir. Dec. 15, 2014).
Lindsey M. West
ABSTRACT
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed dismissal of three consolidated actions of the
Schaghticoke Tribal Nation claiming the Schaghticoke had been
dispossessed of Indian land without the approval of Congress, a
violation of the Nonintercourse Act. The court found the district
court correctly deferred under the primary jurisdiction doctrine to
the United States Department of Interior’s determination that the
Schaghticoke did not qualify for tribal status. Additionally, the
district court properly relied on the Department of Interior’s factual
findings in holding the Schaghticoke presented insufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie violation of the Nonintercourse
Act.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Second Circuit found the lower court appropriately
dismissed the Schaghticoke Tribal Nation’s (“Schaghticoke”)
consolidated claims that they had been dispossessed of land in
violation of the Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177.1 The
consolidated actions were stayed in 1999 while the Schaghticoke
completed the Department of Interior’s (“DOI”) federal
acknowledgment process.2 After the DOI’s decision to deny the
Schaghticoke tribal status was upheld on appeal,3 the Schaghticoke
pursued these consolidated actions.4 The court affirmed the lower
court’s reliance on DOI’s factual findings in holding that the
Schaghticoke did not establish a prima facie case of a violation of
the Nonintercourse Act.5 Specifically, the lower court found the
Schaghticoke did not show that it was “united in a community
under one leadership or government.”6

1

Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Kent School Corp. Inc., 2014 WL 7011937, *1,
(2d Cir. Dec. 15, 2014) [hereinafter STN III].
2
Id.
3
Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Kempthorne, 587 F.3d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 2009)
[hereinafter STN I].
4
STN III, 2014 WL 7011937, at *1.
5
Id.
6
Id.
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Bureau of Indian Affairs Determination
In 2005, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) issued a
reconsidered final determination7 declining to recognize
Schaghticoke’s “tribal existence.”8 Pursuant to the Administrative
Procedures Act, Schaghticoke appealed the BIA’s decision.9 The
district court upheld BIA’s determination that the Schaghticoke
failed to satisfy the criteria for “community” and “political
influence or authority” necessary under controlling regulations10
because a substantial portion of the Schaghticoke refused to enroll
as tribal members.11
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the Schaghticoke argued
that the DOI’s decision was the product of improper political
influence.12 Despite recognition that Connecticut’s governor and
attorney general expressed to DOI officials “adamant opposition”
and introduced a bill titled the “Schaghticoke Acknowledgment
Repeal Act,” the Second Circuit affirmed that there was no
evidence that the agency was improperly influenced.13 In addition,
the Court affirmed the district court’s decision that the DOI had
not violated the Vacancies Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. § 3345
(“VRA”).14 The VRA provides that “only the head of [the]
Executive agency may perform any function or duty.”15 The
Schaghticoke claimed the DOI violated this statutory obligation
when the Secretary of the Interior appointed the Assistant Deputy
Secretary to conduct the acknowledgment process, instead of the
principal deputy. The Second Circuit held that the Secretary of
Interior properly appointed the “authorized representative” who
ultimately denied acknowledgement of the Schaghticoke’s tribal
status.16 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.17

7

Reconsidered Final Determination To Decline To Acknowledge the
Schaghticoke Tribal Nation, 70 Fed. Reg. 60101 (Oct. 14, 2005).
8
STN I, 587 F.3d at 134.
9
United States v. 43.47 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situated in the County of
Litchfield, Town of Kent, 896 F. Supp. 2d 151 (D. Conn. 2012) [hereinafter STN
II].
10
25 C.F.R. § 83.7(b)-(c) (2012).
11
STN II, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 155.
12
STN I, 587 F.3d at 134.
13
Id.
14
Id at 135.
15
Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 3348 (2012)).
16
Id.
17
Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Salazar, 131 S. Ct. 127 (2010).
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B. District Court Decision
The Schaghticoke’s claimed in the three consolidated
actions before the district court that their land had been wrongfully
conveyed in violation of the Nonintercourse Act.18 The lead case,
U.S. v. 43.47 Acres, is a condemnation action by the federal
government under eminent domain to quiet title to two parcels of
land totaling 126.99 acres.19 The two other cases are land claim
actions by the Schaghticoke against defendants who have current
ownership interests in the land.20 Relying on DOI’s factual
findings, the district court held the Schaghticoke had failed to
establish a prima facie case under the Nonintercourse Act because
the Schaghticoke could not prove it was a tribe under federal
common law.21 Further, the court found the Schaghticoke was
collaterally estopped from litigating its status as an Indian tribe
under the Nonintercourse Act because the group was bound by
DOI’s determination denying its tribal existence.22
III. ANALYSIS
The Nonintercourse Act states “[n]o purchase, grant, lease,
or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from
any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law
or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered
into pursuant to the Constitution.”23 Establishing a prima facie
case under the Nonintercourse Act requires, as a threshold
question, that the Schaghticoke qualify as an Indian tribe.24
Applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the Second Circuit
found the district court’s reliance on the DOI’s factual findings in
denying the Schaghticoke tribal status was proper, and that the
Shaghticoke therefore could not establish a prima facie violation of
the Nonintercourse Act.25 The primary jurisdiction doctrine is a
“judicial doctrine whereby a court tends to favor allowing an
agency an initial opportunity to decide an issue in a case in which
the court and the agency have concurrent jurisdiction.”26

18

STN II, 896 F. Supp. 2d at 154.
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 158.
22
Id. at 162.
23
Id. at 154 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012)).
24
Id. at 156 (quoting Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 39
F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1994)).
25
STN III, 2014 WL 7011937, at *1.
26
Id. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1310 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 9th ed.
2009)).
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To constitute a tribe under the Nonintercourse Act, a group
must show under the standard annunciated in Montoya v. U.S., that
it is a “community under one leadership or government.”27 In
contrast, DOI regulations require a group meet seven criteria to
qualify, including that (1) a predominant portion of the petitioning
group comprises a distinct community and have existed as a
community from historical times until the present; and (2) the
petitioner has maintained political influence or authority over its
members as an autonomous entity from historical times until the
present.28 The court found that the district court properly deferred
to DOI’s factual findings in holding the Schaghticoke had
presented insufficient evidence to satisfy the Montoya standard
because they were only a distinct community from 1920 to 1967
and after 1996, and lacked “political influence or authority over
tribal members.”29 Finally, the court declined to address whether
the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies here because it was
moot.30
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the DOI’s criteria in recognizing a tribe is much
more strict than the common law standard under the
Nonintercourse Act, the Second Circuit held the district court
properly deferred to the DOI’s factual findings under the primary
jurisdiction doctrine in holding that the Schaghticoke Nation was
not entitled to tribal status. Thus, the Schaghticoke will continue
their quest for federal recognition.31

27

Id. (quoting Montoya v. U.S., 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901)).
Id. (citing 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(b)-(c)).
29
Id. at *2.
30
Id.
31
See Shaghticoke Tribal Nation’s website, Schaghticoke Tribal Nation,
http://www.schaghticoke.com (accessed Feb. 8, 2015).
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